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Many if not most economic analyses of Britain's economic difficulties suggest that slow growth is at the heart of the problem-and an acceleration of growth the obvious cure. Past experience in Britain and in the Third World casts doubts on this. Except for the last three or four years, per capita growth rates in Britain since the war have been almost as fast or faster than at any time since the start of the industrial revolution. In terms of unemployment, income distribution and export-import balance Britain's post-war performance has also been better than for most of the last century.
Recent work on developing countries has shown that poverty, employment problems, inequality, foreign exchange difficulties and heavy international 'dependence' arise as much from the structure and pattern of a country's development as from its growth rate. Similarly, the eradiction of these problems depends as much on structural change as on growth. If this is true for poor countties why not also for a country like Britain, very much richer and mush more industrialised? Instead of our somewhat naive faith in growth and our short run monetarist or neo-Keynesian preoccupations-should we not direct economic policy much more explicity towards what is needed to restructure the British economy in the short and over the longer run? Such restructuring would need to focus on a number of issues, but the concepts of basic needs and national selfreliance, approaches and priorities suggested in analyses of Third World problems, interpreted within the context of a still relatively rich, industrialised country, might provide helpful guidelines. It is not even clear that aggregate growth has more than a minor part to play in the process.
Britain's past economic performance Since the industrial revolution began about two centuries ago, the long-run pattern of British economic development has been of very slow but relatively steady growth. There was little or no redistribution, except for the major and very important reduction in inequality between the slump of the 1930s and the establishment of the 12 welfare state by the mid 1950s.1 The distinctive tong run characteristic of the British pattern has been creeping growth rather than creeping socialism.
The long-run trends in British growth can be judged by the rates of increase of real GNP over the 30 years periods, shown in Table 1 . The trend growth rate was just under 3 per cent per annum over the first part of the 19th century, dipped to just under 2+ per cent per annum in the middle and ended at just over 3 per cent. The average growth rate over the whole century was virtually identical to the 2.7 per cent per annum achieved over the period of nearly three decades following the second world war . (Taking account of the last three or four years stagnation, the 1946-76 rate would be somewhat lower, probably 2.3 per cent per anum). In contrast with this slow, long haul of growth, redistribution of personal incomes has been quantitatively signficant only in this century.
Although there appear to have been minor improvements in the distribution of income in the quarter-century or so before 1914, when the basis I Over the last few years, rapid inflation and various controls in incomes and profits appear to have brought other changes in distribution-though it is too early to assess reliably the extent of these or how permanent they will be. Because only limited changes in the distribution of personal incomes occurred before the second world war, one must not assume that distribution in other respects has not changed. Income by factor shares has shifted markedly over the last two centuries. From the beginning of the 19th century to post second world war, the share of national income from all forms of rent declined dramatically. Rents were some 20 per cent of 2 Soltow, (1968) 1911/13-1962/3 substantial decrease in inequality. Besides these changes in overall inequality, upper tail income tax data show evidence of continuous decline in inequality between 1801, 1911/12 and 1962/3 . The more recent evidence is summarised in the report of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth, in R. J. Nicholson (1967) , and B. Abel-Smith, and Townsend, (1965) . Note that within the limitaticns of the data, most analysts agree that poverty and inequality were both significantly reduced over the decade or two until the early 1950s-but that it is much more doubtful whether the process has continued thereafter. national income in 1801 hut had fallen to 4 per cent by 1948/57. Moreover, the share of profits, interest and mixed incomes halved from about 40 per cent to about 24 per cent over the same period (21 per cent by 1966, even lower in the last few years), though all of the latter decline took place during this century. In contrast employment incomes have increased-from some 44 per cent of national income in 1801 to some 73 per cent in 1966.
In terms of the living standards and styles of Source: OECD. Public Expenditure on Income Maintenance Programmes, OECD, Paris, July, 1976, p.109 both the rich and the really poor, these have meant significant changes. From the beginning of the 20th century, for example, the share of home-rents had fallen from about 9 per cent of national income to about 3 per cent, largely reflecting rent controls and subsidised council housing. The gradual build up of unemployment relief and state pensions beginning with the Liberal reforms of 1906-14 were tremendously significant.3 On the other side, so to speak, domestic service which formed 5 to 6 per cent of recorded output at the end of the 19th century has virtually disappeared in recent years (though it has been partly replaced by household equipment and non-household services). There is certainly no cause for complacency in the present crisis, with the threats it holds for the social services and the capacity or willingness of government to restore high rates of employment and effective welfare state policies, the two pillars on which the positive post war gains in income distribution rested. Nevertheless, the dramatic improvements over the extremes of poverty and inequality in earlier times should be recognised.
3 A good summary is available in Hay, 1975. In Britain, as in several OECD countries, the rate of unemployment in 1976 was almost double the average of 1962-73g (Table 3) . For example, the NIESR analysis published in February, 1977 , estimated that to reduce unemployment from 1.4 mn. to a full employment level of about 0.5 mn. "would need an increase of some 9 per cent in GDP-this it must be stressed, in addition to the increase of approaching 3 per cent per annum (reflecting the growth of output per head, together with the rather rapid increase in the labour force expected over the next five years) required merely to halt the rise in unemployment. Thus to return to full employment in five years, for example, would require an annual growth rate over the period of nearly The fact that even 5 per cent might be very difficult to attain-it is nearly double the rate of growth achieved over any significant period in Britain over the last two centuries-should itself be sufficient to suggest that to rely primarily 5 Appalling as the current level of unemployment in Britain may be, it is worth noting that in no less than 25 years of the present century, the rate of unemployment has been higher than the current rate, and in two-thirds of them, Britain: the pattern of technological advance and the need for a major shift of policy towards the small producers; integrated local development schemes with more central support for local planning; a more selective approach to foreign investment; a radical change of policy towards informal sector services and methods of production; changes in education; incomes policy; a restructuring of government revenue and expenditure with employment objectives in mind. Each of these and some other areas of policy would, of course, need to be expanded and analysed at length as, for instance, was done in the ILO report on Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya (from the summary chapter of which the above headings were taken). One would also need to consider the influences on labour force 6 See, for example, the ILO employment missions to Colombia (1970 ) Sri Lanka (1971 and Kenya (1972) , in which members of the IDS were heavily involved. Several years ago it was suggested that the ILO might send an employment mission to Britain. Unfortunately little official interest wa shown in this interesting idea.
supply: population growth, changing participation rates particularly of women (which have been rising), retirement policy and the whole set of factors determining the composition of the labour force.
The key point is that an employment policy built up from such a structural analysis would differ fundamentally from one emphasising GNP expansion. Growth would probably still be involved but it would be growth implied by the specifics of strategy to reach and maintain full employment and meet other social and economic objectives, rather than an aggregate goal from which the resources required to meet other economic objectives might hopefully be financed. And the specifics of these other social and economic objectives and of how to attain them would need to be made a central part of the debate on economic and employment policy, not left peripheral to it.
Slructural change and the problem of poverty
Such an approach would raise immediately the problem of poverty, clearly related to the problem of unemployment but conceptually distinct.
(Indeed Third World analyses have emphasised that the two problems ought generally to be considered together, both foranalytical and policy making purposes.) Some 7 to 13 per cent of the British population are estimated to fall below 'the poverty line' (as variously defined), less than in several other OECD countries but still unreasonably high (Table 4 ). Yet the amount by which their incomes in total fall short of the poverty line is only small, barely I per cent of GNP. The same is true, according to recent OECD reports, for a number of OECD countries (OECD, 1976) . Long run growth is hardly a necessary and certainly not a sufficient condition to fill a gap of this size. More significant, it is not clear that growth alone will even assist with the matter. According to the OECD study, for instance, expenditure on income maintenance programmes over the decade until 1972 rose nearly three times as fast as per capita income in Britain, yet poverty remained.
In large part, this was because of widespread 'leakages' which meant that most of the resources provided for income maintenance went to persons other than the poor or, if they did reach the poor, were offset by other reductions in their incomes. Some 8 per cent of GNP was spent on income maintenance but only a fraction helped the poor. Again, the eradication of poverty in Britain, as in most of the other industrialised countries, is a matter of structural changes which will deal with the causes of this poverty, not just more money: the issue is not really one of GNP. 8.0
